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Abstract—In Industry 4.0 independent entities should inter-
operate to allow flexible and customized production. To assure the
parties that individual components are secured to inter-operate,
we investigate automated standard compliance. The standard
compliance is defined based on given sets of security and safety
requirements for which measurable indicator points are derived.
Those reflect configurations of systems recommended by security,
safety or process management relevant standards and guidelines,
which help to demonstrate the state of compliance. We propose
in this paper an approach to automate such an assessment
when components are inter-operating with each other by using a
monitoring and standard compliance verification framework. The
framework will assure the parties that services or devices within
their organizations operate in a secure and standard compliant
way, without compromising the underlying infrastructure.
Index Terms—Security, safety, organizational, standard, com-
pliance, monitoring, Cyber Physical Systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE increasing demand for flexible and customized pro-duction brings new challenges to the existing manufac-
turing systems. To address these challenges, lots of research
has been conducted to pave the way for the fourth industrial
revolution, known as Industry 4.0, which aims to optimize pro-
duction by sharing physical and cyber resources [1]. This may
also include inter-operation between individual companies or
legal entities within large enterprises. Existing technologies,
such as Internet of Things, System of Systems, Cyber Physical
Systems, cloud computing and Service Oriented Architectures,
allow for such inter-operation already [2]. Nevertheless, it is
important for entities to assure that the components inter-
operate in a safe and secure manner and prove it at any point
of time.
In the industrial environments, the fulfilment of security, and
safety requirements of devices autonomously communicating
with each other plays a fundamental role. Consequences of
security incidents in different areas or dimensions, can be for
example interruption or modification of an operational process,
or even sabotage with intention to cause harm. Manipulating
or interrupting such systems could also affect safety, which
can have consequences such as environmental damage, injury
or loss of life [3]. To allow interoperability, flexibility and
customized production from the industrial devices to the
backend infrastructure and to prevent failures during business
process execution, organizational aspects should be in place.
According to Gaitanides et al., [4] the main goal of process
management is customer satisfaction. To achieve this the
quality products and services must be improved, cycle time
must be reduced and cost must be kept as low as possible. A
correct configuration of systems is the key to support proper
business process execution and audits or compliance checks
of system configurations should provide a method to monitor
and verify a valid state.
Security, safety and organizational incidents are tolerated
more easily if one can show that they occurred despite system
compliance with all applicable security regulations. This can
be achieved via manual audits, which are often based on
existing standards and guidelines.
The new technologies and requirements of Industry 4.0
create a new demand for standardization, which plays a
key role in improving security and safety across different
regions and communities. In the last years, different standard
organizations have been established, mostly initiated from
industry, and have published various standards in different
fields and topics. Despite the extensive research [5], [6], [7],
and a considerable number of widely accepted security, safety,
legal and organizational standards, existing approaches are
incapable of meeting the requirements imposed by challenges
and issues in Industry 4.0.
In order to address the aforementioned concerns, in our
previous work [8], we have proposed an initial approach to
automatically verify standard compliance by using a monitor-
ing and standard compliance verification framework, as shown
in Figure 1. In this paper we extend the framework with MOIs
to assure that the system is compliant with organizational
standards.
Fig. 1: High level view of standard compliance verification
The monitoring and standard compliance framework, built
on our previous work [9], uses an Evidence Gathering Mech-
anism to collect evidence from a number of components
in the target system based on a set of measurable indica-
tor points. The Measurable Indicator Points, categorized in
measurable security indicators, measurable safety indicators
and measurable organizational indicators, are extracted from
existing standards and guidelines to address target system
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specific requirements (e.g. access control systems for the pro-
duction line should be resistant against side-channel attacks).
The information gained from the MIPs is then used by the
compliance module to define if the target system is operating
in a secure and standard compliant way.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews widely used security and safety standards/best practice
guidelines and research on monitoring (security, safety and
organizational) and compliance. Section III presents the overall
architecture of the framework and the standard compliance
verification approach. In Section IV an end-to-end communi-
cation use case and a representative set of MIPs is provided
and we conclude our work in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
To enable the global usability of the products and systems,
standardization in the industrial environment is of utmost im-
portance. The new technologies and requirements of Industry
4.0 create a new demand for standardization, which plays a key
role in improving security, safety and organizational aspects
across different areas and in different communities. In the last
years, several organizations have published various standards
in different fields and topics. ENISA 1, ETSI 2, ISO 3 and
IEC 4 are some of the most popular standardization bodies.
ISO 27000-series standards [10], also known as ISMS
family of standards, deal with a different area of information
security including requirements, implementation guidelines
and risk management. The standards cover almost all the
aspects of technology and business addressing cyber-security,
privacy, confidentiality and other aspects of security issues by
providing updates on the latest technologies and threats.
ISO/IEC 15408 [11], known as Common Criteria, provides
a framework where the security functionality of IT products
and the assurance requirements during a security evaluation
can be specified. The CC evaluation is divided in three parts.
The CC part 1, provides general concepts of IT security
and defines the core concept of a TOE. The CC part 2 -
Security functional components, includes a catalog of security
functional components and categorizes them in a hierarchical
order based on families, classes and components. The CC
part 3 - Security assurance components, defines the assurance
requirements of the TOE expressed in a PP or a ST. It
also includes the EAL that defines the scale for measuring
assurance for each component of the TOE. Nevertheless, CC
has only focused on security evaluation without considering
safety or legal aspects.
IoT Security Compliance Framework [12] is an assurance
guideline for organizations used to provide structured evidence
to demonstrate conformance with best practice guidelines. The
compliance scheme in this document is based on risk profiles
for different systems and environments including: (i) business
processes, (ii) devices and aggregation points, (iii) networking
and (iv) cloud and server elements. The compliance process is
based on a set of requirements of organizations and products
by defining five classes of compliance on a scale from 0
1 https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/standards/standards
2 https://www.etsi.org/ 3 https://www.iso.org/home.html
4 https://www.iec.ch/
to 4. The compliance process determines also the levels
of confidentiality, integrity and availability (C-I-A) for each
compliance class. In order to apply the required level of
security and to maintain the level of trust for IoT systems,
each requirement includes an ID, the compliance class, and
the applicability category.
A recent review of the literature on IoT security and trust
is conducted in [13]. The authors evaluate relevant existing
solutions related to IoT security, privacy and trust. The existing
work is analyzed based on topics such as authentication, access
control, privacy, policy enforcement, trust, confidentiality and
secure middleware. In [13] the main research challenges in
IoT security, the most relevant solutions and the questions that
arise for future research related to security and trust in IoT are
presented. The overview shows that available solutions involve
different technologies and standards, but a unified vision for
security requirements is still missing.
Julisch [14] introduces the compliance problem by focusing
on security requirements. In this paper, security is the state
of being safe from threats and the security compliance is
the evidence (assurance) that a given set of requirements is
met, which can be security requirements or other security
mechanisms imposed by standards. He underlines that, in
order to narrow the gap between academia and industry, it is
necessary to focus more research on the question of security
compliance to help organizations to comply with best practices
guidelines and standards.
For safety the basic safety standard is IEC 61508 [15]
“Functional Safety of Electrical / Electronic / Programmable
Electronic Safety-Related System”. This standard is developed
as a domain independent standard which can be adapted for
all domains without a domain-specific standard. The process
industry, based on IEC 61508, IEC 61511 [16] developed
the ”Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the
process industry sector”. Such a domain specific instantiation
is mainly developed to consider peculiarities from a specific
domain. For the industrial sectors both standards are relevant.
Compliance to both standards was mostly evaluated during
the design time [17], [18]. It was assumed that safety-critical
systems are stable and compliance can be completely checked
during design time. Due to Industry 4.0 and the goal of
increased production flexibility there is an increasing need to
check compliance also during run-time. Existing approaches
utilize mainly concepts from contract-based development [19].
This assumes that the basic blocks of a safety-critical system
will stay the same and are assessed during design-time.
Contracts are then used to check the compliance of different
system compositions based on pre-checked blocks [20]. While
such approaches make it possible to shift a part of the safety
assessment towards run-time, there is still the challenge that
with flexible and configurable systems components need to be
checked if they are still compliant with their respective safety
standard.
Standards such as ISO 9001:2015, ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288,
ISO 18404, ISO/IEC 29169, ISO IEC TS 33052, etc., are some
of the standards considering business process management.
ISO 9001 [21] is an international standard that specifies
requirements for a QMS and is used by organizations to
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IoT security, the most relevant solutions and the questions that
arise for future research related to security and trust in IoT are
presented. The overview shows that available solutions involve
different technologies and standards, but a unified vision for
security requirements is still missing.
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met, which can be security requirements or other security
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as a domain independent standard which can be adapted for
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industry, based on IEC 61508, IEC 61511 [16] developed
the ”Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the
process industry sector”. Such a domain specific instantiation
is mainly developed to consider peculiarities from a specific
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Compliance to both standards was mostly evaluated during
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systems are stable and compliance can be completely checked
during design time. Due to Industry 4.0 and the goal of
increased production flexibility there is an increasing need to
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will stay the same and are assessed during design-time.
Contracts are then used to check the compliance of different
system compositions based on pre-checked blocks [20]. While
such approaches make it possible to shift a part of the safety
assessment towards run-time, there is still the challenge that
with flexible and configurable systems components need to be
checked if they are still compliant with their respective safety
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Standards such as ISO 9001:2015, ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288,
ISO 18404, ISO/IEC 29169, ISO IEC TS 33052, etc., are some
of the standards considering business process management.
ISO 9001 [21] is an international standard that specifies
requirements for a QMS and is used by organizations to
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to send to the Compliance module by using a writing buffer.
It makes the mapping of the measurable metrics possible
and their values with the standards to provide the necessary
information for the compliance module. The EGM module
consists of:
a) Monitoring Agent Manager: The Monitoring Agent
Manager is the only contact point between the EGM module
and the MA i. It is responsible for organizing the MA i
based on the configurations and uses a Monitoring Scheduler
to provide the run-time of each plugin in the corresponding
component.
b) Monitoring Source Standard: The Monitoring Source
Standard provides for each defined measurable metric the
source from which standard/best practice guideline the metric
is extracted. By mapping the MIPs to the specific standard,
the compliance module can cross-check if the specific metric
has been monitored in the target system.
c) Bitwise MIPs Representation: The Bitwise MIPs Rep-
resentation module represents every MIP by a number, which
can be converted to binary and operated on by a computer.
The EGM module gathers the monitoring data in a column
structure based on the MIPs (MSI, MSFI, and MOI). For each
MIP the following information is provided: (i) metric ID, (ii)
value of the metric, which can be a binary value, true/false
value, etc and (iii) the source based on the standard/best
practice guideline from where the metric is extracted. A
representative set of the information provided by the EGM
module is shown in Figure 3. The information provided by
Fig. 3: A representative set of the information provided by the
EGM module
the EGM module is used as input for the Compliance module
for further analysis.
B. Standard Compliance Verification
In Industry 4.0 large monolithic organisations are moving
towards multi-stakeholder cooperations, where cooperation is
fostered by market requirements such as sustainable, flexible,
efficient, competitive and customized production [1]. Despite
the benefits, this brings new challenges in terms of security,
safety and organizational related issues. Thus, it is of utmost
importance to assure that independent entities inter-operate
with each-other in a secure and standard compliant manner,
without compromising the underlying infrastructure.
In this paper we present an initial approach for standard
compliance verification. The Compliance module is responsi-
ble for assuring that the system is operating in a secure and
standard compliant manner driven by the input provided by
the EGM module. The compliance depends on a set of MIPs,
which are extracted from a number of widely used standards
and best practice guidelines to address the target system
specific requirements. Thus, in order to measure standard
compliance one has to consider a set of MIPs and a set of
standards, since a dynamic mix of new technologies, regula-
tions and interactions of different organizations are involved.
However, it is not easy to extract metrics for security, safety
and organizational related issues [30], [31], since the indirect
relationship and the dependability between them have to be
considered as well. In the following section we present a
representative set of MIPs for a specific target system and
show how such a metric can be described.
Fig. 4: Security standard compliance verification
To show the standard compliance verification approach,
we have considered only MSIs. However, the same approach
applies also for MSFIs and MOIs. Each MSI extracted from
a standard is monitored using monitoring agents in the corre-
sponding component of the target system. The monitoring data
are than gathered by the EGM module, which is responsible
for making them readable for the Compliance module. So, the
EGM sends to the Compliance module for each MSI the source
from which the metric is extracted and a binary value 1 or 0
that indicates if the metric is fulfilled or not. Depending on
the specific target system requirements the Compliance module
assigns to each MSI a weight value to indicate the importance
in the range [0, 1].
After gathering all the required evidence from the EGM
module, the Compliance module first verifies the compli-
ance [%] for a single standard as the ratio between the sum
of each MSI measured value multiplied by its weight value
and the total number of metrics per standard as shown in
equation 1. It verifies the total compliance [%] as the ratio
between the sum of each standard compliance and the total







demonstrate the ability to consistently provide products and
services that meet customer and regulatory requirements.
Additionally, a process approach is suggested including the
PDCA-Cycle and risk based thinking. The PDCA-cycle helps
organizations to define processes, execute them, measure the
outcome and analyse the results to set actions for further
improvement.
ISO 18404 [22] provides tools for organizations to improve
the capability of their business processes. This increase in
performance and decrease in process variation leads to defect
reduction and improvement in profits, employee morale, and
quality of products or services. It focuses on clarifying compe-
tencies required for personnel and organizations in SixSigma,
Lean and ”Lean&SixSigma”. Moreover, this standard consti-
tutes general requirements from personnel (e.g. Black Belt) or
organizations due to the numerous existing combinations of
Lean and Six Sigma. Therefore, competencies for individual
skill levels are described in details, such as Black Belt, Green
Belt, Lean practitioners and their organizations. However, a
specification and design for Six Sigma is excluded.
ISO/IEC TS 33052 [23] is used to describe the structure of a
process reference model to support information security man-
agement. The PRM includes processes, derived from ISO/IEC
27001, which can already exist in the context of a management
system of a service provider. This standard is used to deploy
and control the execution and performance of operational and
organizational processes by supporting the efficient, timely and
quality day-to-day operations.
Although the produced guidelines and scientific work help
users to address industrial requirements, more standard com-
pliance measurements are needed.
There are various frameworks and platforms supporting
monitoring of CPS and IoT. Several approaches and prototypes
are presente, both in literature [24], [25], [26] and in the scope
of research projects such as Cumulus, NGcert, SECCRIT etc.
However, there is no generally accepted method that allows
mapping the security, safety and organizational compliance.
In this context, the proposed monitoring and standard compli-
ance verification framework advances the state of the art by
considering security, safety and organizational related aspects
without compromising the underlying infrastructure.
III. MONITORING AND STANDARD COMPLIANCE
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
Standard compliance is the adherence to a given set of
security and safety requirements, represented by measurable
metrics, on the use and configuration of systems or any other
security, safety or legal mechanism. These measurable metrics
should be imposed by standardized bodies to make each
system, device or application comply with the standards.
To assure that the system is operating in a secure and stan-
dard compliant manner a monitoring module is needed, which
is responsible for gathering all the required measurements.
Thus, in this paper we present a monitoring and standard
compliance verification framework, which has been designed
to support different use cases and viewpoints that should be
considered and researched in Industry 4.0.
The monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work, illustrated in Figure 2, makes it possible to gather
security, safety and organizational evidence from the target
system in a structured way (e.g. MSI, MSFI, MOI). The
architecture of the framework has a pluggable and expendable
architecture allowing easy adaptation to constantly analyze
and monitor the status of the system or components of the
system. It is possible to monitor a large number of measurable
metrics (as shown in Section IV B-D) for different CPPS
components by aggregating, scheduling, storing, retrieving and
analyzing the monitoring data to provide standard compliance
verification.
Fig. 2: Monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work used to measure, aggregate, schedule, store, retrieve and
analyze the monitoring data to provide standard compliance
The monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work is composed of four main modules, including Monitoring
Agents, Evidence Gathering Mechanism, Compliance and the
Target System. The TS represents a system or component of
a system that will be monitored by monitoring tool plugins or
customized scripts.
A. Monitoring components
1) Monitoring Agents (MA): The MA module is used to
gather data from the TS and should allow the integration of
different pluggable monitoring agents (MA i) from different
monitoring tool plugins (e.g., Nagios plugin [27], Ceilometer
plugin [28], Zabbix plugin [29], etc.) and customized scripts.
2) Evidence Gathering Mechanism (EGM): The EGM
module is designed to acquire, store and analyze security,
safety and legal related evidence [9]. It manages the incoming
data from the monitoring agents and decides when/what data
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between the sum of each standard compliance and the total







demonstrate the ability to consistently provide products and
services that meet customer and regulatory requirements.
Additionally, a process approach is suggested including the
PDCA-Cycle and risk based thinking. The PDCA-cycle helps
organizations to define processes, execute them, measure the
outcome and analyse the results to set actions for further
improvement.
ISO 18404 [22] provides tools for organizations to improve
the capability of their business processes. This increase in
performance and decrease in process variation leads to defect
reduction and improvement in profits, employee morale, and
quality of products or services. It focuses on clarifying compe-
tencies required for personnel and organizations in SixSigma,
Lean and ”Lean&SixSigma”. Moreover, this standard consti-
tutes general requirements from personnel (e.g. Black Belt) or
organizations due to the numerous existing combinations of
Lean and Six Sigma. Therefore, competencies for individual
skill levels are described in details, such as Black Belt, Green
Belt, Lean practitioners and their organizations. However, a
specification and design for Six Sigma is excluded.
ISO/IEC TS 33052 [23] is used to describe the structure of a
process reference model to support information security man-
agement. The PRM includes processes, derived from ISO/IEC
27001, which can already exist in the context of a management
system of a service provider. This standard is used to deploy
and control the execution and performance of operational and
organizational processes by supporting the efficient, timely and
quality day-to-day operations.
Although the produced guidelines and scientific work help
users to address industrial requirements, more standard com-
pliance measurements are needed.
There are various frameworks and platforms supporting
monitoring of CPS and IoT. Several approaches and prototypes
are presente, both in literature [24], [25], [26] and in the scope
of research projects such as Cumulus, NGcert, SECCRIT etc.
However, there is no generally accepted method that allows
mapping the security, safety and organizational compliance.
In this context, the proposed monitoring and standard compli-
ance verification framework advances the state of the art by
considering security, safety and organizational related aspects
without compromising the underlying infrastructure.
III. MONITORING AND STANDARD COMPLIANCE
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
Standard compliance is the adherence to a given set of
security and safety requirements, represented by measurable
metrics, on the use and configuration of systems or any other
security, safety or legal mechanism. These measurable metrics
should be imposed by standardized bodies to make each
system, device or application comply with the standards.
To assure that the system is operating in a secure and stan-
dard compliant manner a monitoring module is needed, which
is responsible for gathering all the required measurements.
Thus, in this paper we present a monitoring and standard
compliance verification framework, which has been designed
to support different use cases and viewpoints that should be
considered and researched in Industry 4.0.
The monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work, illustrated in Figure 2, makes it possible to gather
security, safety and organizational evidence from the target
system in a structured way (e.g. MSI, MSFI, MOI). The
architecture of the framework has a pluggable and expendable
architecture allowing easy adaptation to constantly analyze
and monitor the status of the system or components of the
system. It is possible to monitor a large number of measurable
metrics (as shown in Section IV B-D) for different CPPS
components by aggregating, scheduling, storing, retrieving and
analyzing the monitoring data to provide standard compliance
verification.
Fig. 2: Monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work used to measure, aggregate, schedule, store, retrieve and
analyze the monitoring data to provide standard compliance
The monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work is composed of four main modules, including Monitoring
Agents, Evidence Gathering Mechanism, Compliance and the
Target System. The TS represents a system or component of
a system that will be monitored by monitoring tool plugins or
customized scripts.
A. Monitoring components
1) Monitoring Agents (MA): The MA module is used to
gather data from the TS and should allow the integration of
different pluggable monitoring agents (MA i) from different
monitoring tool plugins (e.g., Nagios plugin [27], Ceilometer
plugin [28], Zabbix plugin [29], etc.) and customized scripts.
2) Evidence Gathering Mechanism (EGM): The EGM
module is designed to acquire, store and analyze security,
safety and legal related evidence [9]. It manages the incoming
data from the monitoring agents and decides when/what data
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use case and the access control requirements, we define a set of
representative MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs extracted from security,
safety and process management standards. For each MIP is
provided: (i) an ID, (ii) the source and the definition based
on the standards and best practice guidelines, (iii) possible
monitoring solutions and (iv) a monitoring value are provided.
B. MSIs: Measurable Security Indicators
• MSI-1.1: Secure identification and authentication
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The client and the server identify each
other and assure their identities via secure log-on
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with Nagios
monitoring agent, which checks the configuration of
the used protocol (or indeed any other client/server
authentication method) to make sure that it uses a
secure communication protocol.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSI-2.1 : Strength of password-based authentication
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The system shall be configurable by pro-
viding a degree of complexity such as minimum
length, variety of characters and password rotation.
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be implemented by perform-
ing checks on the PAM (Pluggable Authentication
Module) to verify if a minimum length or complexity
of passwords and password rotation is enabled.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSI-3.1 : Concurrent session control
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The system shall restrict the maximum
number of concurrent sessions per system account
or system type.
– Monitoring Plugin: A script can be developed which
checks sshd config or pam limits configuration.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
C. MSFIs: Measurable Safety Indicators
• MSFI-1.2 : Time-triggered architecture
– Source: IEC 61508-3, Table A-2, Group 13
– Definition: : Ensure that the system complies with
the safety timing requirements
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be checked via Nagios, send
test packet to system and check if response time is
inside allowed parameters. If Nagios is running on
a separate system this achieves medium diagnostic
coverage (based on IEC 61508-2). If the systems
sends regular information about logical status high
diagnostic coverage is achievable
– Monitoring Value: Response time
• MSFI-2.2 : Techniques and measures for error detection
– Source: IEC 61508-3, Table A-18
– Definition: Ensure that system modifications are pro-
tected against erroneous
– Monitoring Plugin: Check that system modifications
require a password
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSFI-3.2 : Control systematic operational failures
– Source: IEC 61508-7
– Definition: Ensure that all inputs via a safety-related
system are echoed to the operator before being sent
to the system. This should also consider abnormal
human actions, e.g. speed of interaction
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored by a network
module that checks the system behaviour
– Monitoring Value: True/False
D. MOIs: Measurable Organizational Indicators
• MOI-1.1: Event Logging
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system shall forward event log infor-
mation to a central security information and event
management system
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with a Nagios
plugin checking syslog/event log configuration
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MOI-2.1: Restrictions on software installations
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system shall restrict software instal-
lation to approved products
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with a custom
Nagios plugin checking e.g. paket management (e.g.
Linux) or other software management configuration
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MOI-3.1 : Access to networks and network services
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system configuration must support
access to mandatory networks and network services
– Monitoring Plugin: : Can be monitored with a cus-
tom Nagios plugin checking network device and
network service configuration (e.g., DNS, DHCP,
Gateway, Netmask, NPS, 802.1x Cert etc.)
– Monitoring Value: True/False
As illustrated in Figure 2, the monitoring agents defined for
each MIP, will gather data from the target system (in this case
the end-to-end communication use case) and will provide for
the EGM the necessary information if the metric is fulfilled or
not. The Compliance module maps the monitored metric with
the corresponding standard and calculate the compliance [%]
based on equation 2. The result will then be used to define
the compliance level [0-3] of the system as shown in table I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a monitoring and standard
compliance verification framework for Industry 4.0 application
scenarios with the aim to provide an automated standard
compliance. The standard compliance is defined based on a
set of MIPs extracted from existing standards and best practice
guidelines. The MIPs are monitored in the target system using
monitoring agents and the monitoring data are then used by
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TABLE I: Arbitrary compliance levels based on MIPs
The compliance levels, shown in table I, depend on the
standard compliance verification for MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs,
whereas basic is defined as the compliance in the range
[0%, 50%] and high is defined as the compliance in the range
[50%, 100%].
• Compliance Level 0 indicates that the compliance of all
three MIP groups is basic
• Compliance Level 1 indicates that at least the compli-
ance of one MIP group is high
• Compliance Level 2 indicates that at least the compli-
ance of two MIP groups is high
• Compliance Level 3 indicates that the compliance of all
three MIP groups is high
IV. A REPRESENTATIVE SET OF MIPS FOR THE
MONITORING AND STANDARD COMPLIANCE
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
This section provides illustrative metrics that should be
considered in an Industry 4.0 application scenario with the
goal to address the requirements of access control systems
for the production line. In that regard, the IEC 62443-3-3
(Industrial communication networks - Network and system se-
curity - System security requirements and security levels) [32]
provides technical control system fundamentals requirements
for industrial automation and control system capability, where
we have selected three MSIs to show how each MSI is docu-
mented and monitored. The IEC 61508-3 (Functional Safety of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related
Systems) [33], is the basic safety standard and intended as
an umbrella standard by various industries to provide their
own standards and guidelines, from which three MSFIs as
representative examples are selected.
In contrast with security and safety standards, business man-
agement standards do not provide explicit technical measures.
However, some standards provide a methodology on how
to implement and execute assessments. ISO/IEC TS 33052
(Information Technology – Process reference model (PRM)
for information security management) [23] provides process
descriptions which relate to process purpose, process context,
outcomes and traceable requirements. The traceable require-
ments give an indication which tasks and actives are relevant
for certain processes and they are presented as actions that
refer explicitly to ISO/IEC 27001 and relate to common tasks.
It provides a process assessment model (PAM) from where we
have selected three MOIs as representative examples.
A. Use Case
In order to extract MIPs, which can be used to evaluate the
approach described in the previous section, we consider the use
case depicted in Figure 5, from an ongoing research project
addressing a secure end-to-end communication in CPPS [34].
Fig. 5: CPPS end-to-end communication use case
To provide device management as a service, data is trans-
mitted between devices (M1, M2, and M3), processed and
sent to a private cloud for further processing and analysis.
The communication protocol used between the edge devices,
the IIoT components, and the cloud backend is the MQTT
protocol, designed to be lightweight, flexible and simple to
implement. In the production environment, the new industrial
devices are already able to communicate using state of the art
IIoT protocols, such as MQTT. However, this is not the case if
a legacy device wants to establish a connection with the IIoT
gateway. In this case, a translator system is needed to translate
the device protocol into MQTT [35]. In such scenario, with
different decentralized CPPS components, condition reports
to the overall system are important. In order to observe
the system behavior, several components can be monitored,
including industrial devices, IIoT gateways and cloud services.
Once the requirements have been identified and the stan-
dards/best practice guidelines have been examined to see
whether or not they address the specific requirement, the next
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for industrial automation and control system capability, where
we have selected three MSIs to show how each MSI is docu-
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Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related
Systems) [33], is the basic safety standard and intended as
an umbrella standard by various industries to provide their
own standards and guidelines, from which three MSFIs as
representative examples are selected.
In contrast with security and safety standards, business man-
agement standards do not provide explicit technical measures.
However, some standards provide a methodology on how
to implement and execute assessments. ISO/IEC TS 33052
(Information Technology – Process reference model (PRM)
for information security management) [23] provides process
descriptions which relate to process purpose, process context,
outcomes and traceable requirements. The traceable require-
ments give an indication which tasks and actives are relevant
for certain processes and they are presented as actions that
refer explicitly to ISO/IEC 27001 and relate to common tasks.
It provides a process assessment model (PAM) from where we
have selected three MOIs as representative examples.
A. Use Case
In order to extract MIPs, which can be used to evaluate the
approach described in the previous section, we consider the use
case depicted in Figure 5, from an ongoing research project
addressing a secure end-to-end communication in CPPS [34].
Fig. 5: CPPS end-to-end communication use case
To provide device management as a service, data is trans-
mitted between devices (M1, M2, and M3), processed and
sent to a private cloud for further processing and analysis.
The communication protocol used between the edge devices,
the IIoT components, and the cloud backend is the MQTT
protocol, designed to be lightweight, flexible and simple to
implement. In the production environment, the new industrial
devices are already able to communicate using state of the art
IIoT protocols, such as MQTT. However, this is not the case if
a legacy device wants to establish a connection with the IIoT
gateway. In this case, a translator system is needed to translate
the device protocol into MQTT [35]. In such scenario, with
different decentralized CPPS components, condition reports
to the overall system are important. In order to observe
the system behavior, several components can be monitored,
including industrial devices, IIoT gateways and cloud services.
Once the requirements have been identified and the stan-
dards/best practice guidelines have been examined to see
whether or not they address the specific requirement, the next
step is to identify measurable indicator points. Based on this
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to send to the Compliance module by using a writing buffer.
It makes the mapping of the measurable metrics possible
and their values with the standards to provide the necessary
information for the compliance module. The EGM module
consists of:
a) Monitoring Agent Manager: The Monitoring Agent
Manager is the only contact point between the EGM module
and the MA i. It is responsible for organizing the MA i
based on the configurations and uses a Monitoring Scheduler
to provide the run-time of each plugin in the corresponding
component.
b) Monitoring Source Standard: The Monitoring Source
Standard provides for each defined measurable metric the
source from which standard/best practice guideline the metric
is extracted. By mapping the MIPs to the specific standard,
the compliance module can cross-check if the specific metric
has been monitored in the target system.
c) Bitwise MIPs Representation: The Bitwise MIPs Rep-
resentation module represents every MIP by a number, which
can be converted to binary and operated on by a computer.
The EGM module gathers the monitoring data in a column
structure based on the MIPs (MSI, MSFI, and MOI). For each
MIP the following information is provided: (i) metric ID, (ii)
value of the metric, which can be a binary value, true/false
value, etc and (iii) the source based on the standard/best
practice guideline from where the metric is extracted. A
representative set of the information provided by the EGM
module is shown in Figure 3. The information provided by
Fig. 3: A representative set of the information provided by the
EGM module
the EGM module is used as input for the Compliance module
for further analysis.
B. Standard Compliance Verification
In Industry 4.0 large monolithic organisations are moving
towards multi-stakeholder cooperations, where cooperation is
fostered by market requirements such as sustainable, flexible,
efficient, competitive and customized production [1]. Despite
the benefits, this brings new challenges in terms of security,
safety and organizational related issues. Thus, it is of utmost
importance to assure that independent entities inter-operate
with each-other in a secure and standard compliant manner,
without compromising the underlying infrastructure.
In this paper we present an initial approach for standard
compliance verification. The Compliance module is responsi-
ble for assuring that the system is operating in a secure and
standard compliant manner driven by the input provided by
the EGM module. The compliance depends on a set of MIPs,
which are extracted from a number of widely used standards
and best practice guidelines to address the target system
specific requirements. Thus, in order to measure standard
compliance one has to consider a set of MIPs and a set of
standards, since a dynamic mix of new technologies, regula-
tions and interactions of different organizations are involved.
However, it is not easy to extract metrics for security, safety
and organizational related issues [30], [31], since the indirect
relationship and the dependability between them have to be
considered as well. In the following section we present a
representative set of MIPs for a specific target system and
show how such a metric can be described.
Fig. 4: Security standard compliance verification
To show the standard compliance verification approach,
we have considered only MSIs. However, the same approach
applies also for MSFIs and MOIs. Each MSI extracted from
a standard is monitored using monitoring agents in the corre-
sponding component of the target system. The monitoring data
are than gathered by the EGM module, which is responsible
for making them readable for the Compliance module. So, the
EGM sends to the Compliance module for each MSI the source
from which the metric is extracted and a binary value 1 or 0
that indicates if the metric is fulfilled or not. Depending on
the specific target system requirements the Compliance module
assigns to each MSI a weight value to indicate the importance
in the range [0, 1].
After gathering all the required evidence from the EGM
module, the Compliance module first verifies the compli-
ance [%] for a single standard as the ratio between the sum
of each MSI measured value multiplied by its weight value
and the total number of metrics per standard as shown in
equation 1. It verifies the total compliance [%] as the ratio
between the sum of each standard compliance and the total
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use case and the access control requirements, we define a set of
representative MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs extracted from security,
safety and process management standards. For each MIP is
provided: (i) an ID, (ii) the source and the definition based
on the standards and best practice guidelines, (iii) possible
monitoring solutions and (iv) a monitoring value are provided.
B. MSIs: Measurable Security Indicators
• MSI-1.1: Secure identification and authentication
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The client and the server identify each
other and assure their identities via secure log-on
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with Nagios
monitoring agent, which checks the configuration of
the used protocol (or indeed any other client/server
authentication method) to make sure that it uses a
secure communication protocol.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSI-2.1 : Strength of password-based authentication
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The system shall be configurable by pro-
viding a degree of complexity such as minimum
length, variety of characters and password rotation.
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be implemented by perform-
ing checks on the PAM (Pluggable Authentication
Module) to verify if a minimum length or complexity
of passwords and password rotation is enabled.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSI-3.1 : Concurrent session control
– Source: IEC 62443-3-3
– Definition: The system shall restrict the maximum
number of concurrent sessions per system account
or system type.
– Monitoring Plugin: A script can be developed which
checks sshd config or pam limits configuration.
– Monitoring Value: True/False
C. MSFIs: Measurable Safety Indicators
• MSFI-1.2 : Time-triggered architecture
– Source: IEC 61508-3, Table A-2, Group 13
– Definition: : Ensure that the system complies with
the safety timing requirements
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be checked via Nagios, send
test packet to system and check if response time is
inside allowed parameters. If Nagios is running on
a separate system this achieves medium diagnostic
coverage (based on IEC 61508-2). If the systems
sends regular information about logical status high
diagnostic coverage is achievable
– Monitoring Value: Response time
• MSFI-2.2 : Techniques and measures for error detection
– Source: IEC 61508-3, Table A-18
– Definition: Ensure that system modifications are pro-
tected against erroneous
– Monitoring Plugin: Check that system modifications
require a password
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MSFI-3.2 : Control systematic operational failures
– Source: IEC 61508-7
– Definition: Ensure that all inputs via a safety-related
system are echoed to the operator before being sent
to the system. This should also consider abnormal
human actions, e.g. speed of interaction
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored by a network
module that checks the system behaviour
– Monitoring Value: True/False
D. MOIs: Measurable Organizational Indicators
• MOI-1.1: Event Logging
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system shall forward event log infor-
mation to a central security information and event
management system
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with a Nagios
plugin checking syslog/event log configuration
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MOI-2.1: Restrictions on software installations
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system shall restrict software instal-
lation to approved products
– Monitoring Plugin: Can be monitored with a custom
Nagios plugin checking e.g. paket management (e.g.
Linux) or other software management configuration
– Monitoring Value: True/False
• MOI-3.1 : Access to networks and network services
– Source: ISO/IEC TS 33052
– Definition: The system configuration must support
access to mandatory networks and network services
– Monitoring Plugin: : Can be monitored with a cus-
tom Nagios plugin checking network device and
network service configuration (e.g., DNS, DHCP,
Gateway, Netmask, NPS, 802.1x Cert etc.)
– Monitoring Value: True/False
As illustrated in Figure 2, the monitoring agents defined for
each MIP, will gather data from the target system (in this case
the end-to-end communication use case) and will provide for
the EGM the necessary information if the metric is fulfilled or
not. The Compliance module maps the monitored metric with
the corresponding standard and calculate the compliance [%]
based on equation 2. The result will then be used to define
the compliance level [0-3] of the system as shown in table I.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a monitoring and standard
compliance verification framework for Industry 4.0 application
scenarios with the aim to provide an automated standard
compliance. The standard compliance is defined based on a
set of MIPs extracted from existing standards and best practice
guidelines. The MIPs are monitored in the target system using
monitoring agents and the monitoring data are then used by








n total number of metrics per standard
m total number of standards
MSIi,j measured value of ”i” security metric from ”j” standard
ωi,j weight value of ”i” security metric from the ”j” standard
Introduction of Compliance Levels
In order to apply an appropriate level of security and safety
standard compliance to a component or system depending on













Level 3 high high high
TABLE I: Arbitrary compliance levels based on MIPs
The compliance levels, shown in table I, depend on the
standard compliance verification for MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs,
whereas basic is defined as the compliance in the range
[0%, 50%] and high is defined as the compliance in the range
[50%, 100%].
• Compliance Level 0 indicates that the compliance of all
three MIP groups is basic
• Compliance Level 1 indicates that at least the compli-
ance of one MIP group is high
• Compliance Level 2 indicates that at least the compli-
ance of two MIP groups is high
• Compliance Level 3 indicates that the compliance of all
three MIP groups is high
IV. A REPRESENTATIVE SET OF MIPS FOR THE
MONITORING AND STANDARD COMPLIANCE
VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
This section provides illustrative metrics that should be
considered in an Industry 4.0 application scenario with the
goal to address the requirements of access control systems
for the production line. In that regard, the IEC 62443-3-3
(Industrial communication networks - Network and system se-
curity - System security requirements and security levels) [32]
provides technical control system fundamentals requirements
for industrial automation and control system capability, where
we have selected three MSIs to show how each MSI is docu-
mented and monitored. The IEC 61508-3 (Functional Safety of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-related
Systems) [33], is the basic safety standard and intended as
an umbrella standard by various industries to provide their
own standards and guidelines, from which three MSFIs as
representative examples are selected.
In contrast with security and safety standards, business man-
agement standards do not provide explicit technical measures.
However, some standards provide a methodology on how
to implement and execute assessments. ISO/IEC TS 33052
(Information Technology – Process reference model (PRM)
for information security management) [23] provides process
descriptions which relate to process purpose, process context,
outcomes and traceable requirements. The traceable require-
ments give an indication which tasks and actives are relevant
for certain processes and they are presented as actions that
refer explicitly to ISO/IEC 27001 and relate to common tasks.
It provides a process assessment model (PAM) from where we
have selected three MOIs as representative examples.
A. Use Case
In order to extract MIPs, which can be used to evaluate the
approach described in the previous section, we consider the use
case depicted in Figure 5, from an ongoing research project
addressing a secure end-to-end communication in CPPS [34].
Fig. 5: CPPS end-to-end communication use case
To provide device management as a service, data is trans-
mitted between devices (M1, M2, and M3), processed and
sent to a private cloud for further processing and analysis.
The communication protocol used between the edge devices,
the IIoT components, and the cloud backend is the MQTT
protocol, designed to be lightweight, flexible and simple to
implement. In the production environment, the new industrial
devices are already able to communicate using state of the art
IIoT protocols, such as MQTT. However, this is not the case if
a legacy device wants to establish a connection with the IIoT
gateway. In this case, a translator system is needed to translate
the device protocol into MQTT [35]. In such scenario, with
different decentralized CPPS components, condition reports
to the overall system are important. In order to observe
the system behavior, several components can be monitored,
including industrial devices, IIoT gateways and cloud services.
Once the requirements have been identified and the stan-
dards/best practice guidelines have been examined to see
whether or not they address the specific requirement, the next
step is to identify measurable indicator points. Based on this
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To give an example of how such an approach will work, we
have extracted a representative set of MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs
motivated by the requirements provided from an ongoing
research project use case. We have provided the information
on how the MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs can be measured by either
existing monitoring tool plugins or customized scripts.
As part of our future work, we will implement and evaluate
the monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work and we will further analyze other security and safety
standards that are relevant to the industrial environment.
Part of this analysis is also to determine other safety metrics
that can be measured by the MSCV. Hardware based safety
metrics like mean time between failures (MTBF) are difficult
to monitor, and normally static. There are approaches to utilize
contracts during run time to conduct safety assessment for
systems which are composed during run time [36]. Other
metrics which are oriented on hardware properties and need
to be monitored, for example proof testing interval, can be
monitored by setting a flag with time when the proof test is
performed. We will also investigate how the information pro-
vided by the monitoring and standard compliance verification
framework can be integrated in the Arrowhead Framework
e.g., Arrowhed Test Tool (ATT) [37], which enables the





ATT Arrowhead Test Tool
CPPS Cyber Physical Production System
CC Common Criteria
CSCG Cyber Security Coordination Group
CPS Cyber Physical Systems
Cumulus Certification Infrastructure for Multi-Layer Cloud Services
DNS Domain Name System
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
EGM Evidence Gathering Mechanism
ENISA European Network and Information Security
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EAL Evaluation Assurance Levels
IoT Internet of Things
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IEC International Electrotechnical Commision
ISMS Information Security Management System
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things
MIP Measurable Indicator Point
MSI Measurable Security Indicator
MSFI Measurable Safety Indicator
MOI Measurable Organizational Indicator
MA Monitoring Agent
MA i Nr. of Monitoring Agents
MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NGcert Next Generation Certification
PDCA Plan-Do-Check-Act
PRMM Process Reference Model
PRM Process Reference Model
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
PP Protection Profile
QMS Quality Management System
SoS System of Systems
SOA Service Oriented Architecture
ST Security Target
SECCRIT Secure Cloud Computing for Critical Infrastructure IT
TOE Target of Evaluation
TS Target System
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To give an example of how such an approach will work, we
have extracted a representative set of MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs
motivated by the requirements provided from an ongoing
research project use case. We have provided the information
on how the MSIs, MSFIs and MOIs can be measured by either
existing monitoring tool plugins or customized scripts.
As part of our future work, we will implement and evaluate
the monitoring and standard compliance verification frame-
work and we will further analyze other security and safety
standards that are relevant to the industrial environment.
Part of this analysis is also to determine other safety metrics
that can be measured by the MSCV. Hardware based safety
metrics like mean time between failures (MTBF) are difficult
to monitor, and normally static. There are approaches to utilize
contracts during run time to conduct safety assessment for
systems which are composed during run time [36]. Other
metrics which are oriented on hardware properties and need
to be monitored, for example proof testing interval, can be
monitored by setting a flag with time when the proof test is
performed. We will also investigate how the information pro-
vided by the monitoring and standard compliance verification
framework can be integrated in the Arrowhead Framework
e.g., Arrowhed Test Tool (ATT) [37], which enables the





ATT Arrowhead Test Tool
CPPS Cyber Physical Production System
CC Common Criteria
CSCG Cyber Security Coordination Group
CPS Cyber Physical Systems
Cumulus Certification Infrastructure for Multi-Layer Cloud Services
DNS Domain Name System
DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
EGM Evidence Gathering Mechanism
ENISA European Network and Information Security
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EAL Evaluation Assurance Levels
IoT Internet of Things
ISO International Organization for Standardization
IEC International Electrotechnical Commision
ISMS Information Security Management System
IIoT Industrial Internet of Things
MIP Measurable Indicator Point
MSI Measurable Security Indicator
MSFI Measurable Safety Indicator
MOI Measurable Organizational Indicator
MA Monitoring Agent
MA i Nr. of Monitoring Agents
MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NGcert Next Generation Certification
PDCA Plan-Do-Check-Act
PRMM Process Reference Model
PRM Process Reference Model
PAM Pluggable Authentication Module
PP Protection Profile
QMS Quality Management System
SoS System of Systems
SOA Service Oriented Architecture
ST Security Target
SECCRIT Secure Cloud Computing for Critical Infrastructure IT
TOE Target of Evaluation
TS Target System
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